Prior to that point, the plan was to use commercial telephone networks and long-range radios to notify bases hosting nuclear armed bombers of their orders. Development accelerated after the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, but a rudimentary C2 system was not in place until the late 1950s, more than a decade after the development of the first atomic bomb. The first portion of the US NC3 system to be put in place was the series of Distant Early Warning radars begun in 1955 by the United States and Canada to warn of incoming Soviet bomber attack. The need to ensure robust existing capabilities for the current system, plus the desire to create a new system that is more than a simple modernization of existing capabilities, in a world facing more diverse threats, all while harnessing the value-added of new technologies, means that the NC3 system twenty years hence may bear little resemblance to its current arrangement. ![]() ![]() In late 2018 the secretary of defense appointed the commander of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) as the enterprise lead for NC3 and its next generation architecture. That system is in the midst of a sea-change. This paper reviews the legacy NC3 system of the United States as it developed since the early Cold War. ![]() Indeed, some analysts call NC3 the “fifth pillar” of the US nuclear deterrent, after the three legs of the Triad and nuclear weapons themselves. Today, however, the United States is beginning a major modernization effort of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the underlying and critical NC3 systems. US NC3 systems today face multiple challenges after more than two decades of neglect of its nuclear forces and NC3 infrastructure. It includes early warning satellites, radars, and sensors facilities to collect and interpret early warning information fixed and mobile networked command posts and a communications infrastructure that includes land lines, satellite links, radars, radios, and receiving terminals in ground stations and aboard strike vehicles. Nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) thus provides the links between nuclear forces and presidential authority. The command and control (C2) of nuclear forces is a vital piece of the US deterrence mission, and communications is the necessary link to ensure C2 over those weapons under all conditions. Deterrence requires America’s political leadership to be aware of all details surrounding any situation, to make timely decisions, and to be able to communicate those decisions with the appropriate forces. The ultimate authority for the release of American nuclear weapons rests in the hands of the president. US deterrence strategy since 1945 has relied on the credible threat of nuclear weapons use. The combination of these two elements will theoretically dissuade or deter a rational actor from taking any first step toward war, by fear of the consequences. There has been no major great power conflict since World War Two, and the United States has retained its position as a leading superpower.ĭeterrence requires both the capabilities to threaten what an adversary holds most dear, and to convincingly demonstrate to potential adversaries that one has the willingness to carry out the threat to use those capabilities. In this mission, many would argue, American nuclear force and policies have been extremely successful. ![]() The nuclear deterrence forces of the United States of America have been developed over the past 75 years in order to prevent any adversary from attacking the US homeland, its forces deployed abroad, its allies and partners, and its other vital national interests around the globe. NAPSNET SPECIAL REPORT BY JEFFREY LARSEN NUCLEAR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS: US COUNTRY PROFILE AUGUST 22, 2019 Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.īanner image is by Lauren Hostetter of Heyhoss Design II. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. This report is published simultaneously here by Technology for Global Security and here by Nautilus Institute and is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found here. Jeffrey Larsen is president of Larsen Consulting Group.Īcknowledgments: The workshop was funded by the John D. He concludes: “The need to ensure robust existing capabilities for the current system, plus the desire to create a new system that is more than a simple modernization of existing capabilities, in a world facing more diverse threats, all while harnessing the value-added of new technologies, means that the NC3 system twenty years hence may bear little resemblance to its current arrangement.” In this essay, Jeffrey Larsen reviews the legacy NC3 system of the United States now in the midst of a sea-change.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |